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Abstract
I begin by reviewing some recent work on the status of the geodesic principle in general
relativity and the geometrized formulation of Newtonian gravitation. I then turn to the
question of whether either of these theories might be said to “explain” inertial motion. I
argue that there is a sense in which both theories may be understood to explain inertial mo-
tion, but that the sense of “explain” is rather different from what one might have expected.
This sense of explanation is connected with a view of theories—I call it the “puzzleball
view”—on which the foundations of a physical theory are best understood as a network of
mutually interdependent principles and assumptions.
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1. Introduction
There is a very old question in the philosophy of space and time, concerning how and why
bodies move in the particular way that they do in the absence of any external forces. The
question originates with Aristotle, and indeed, the puzzle is particularly acute when one
thinks of it as the ancients might have. Given some external influence on a body, it might
seem clear why that body moves in one fashion rather than another: the external influence
forces it to do so. But when there are no forces present, what does the work of picking one
possible state of motion over any other? Consider planetary motion: there are no apparent
forces acting on planets, and yet they proceed along fixed trajectories. Why these orbits
rather than others? In Aristotelian terms, what determines the “natural motions” of a body?
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The modern answer to the question originates with Galileo and Descartes, but finds its
canonical form in Newton’s first law of motion, which states that in the absence of external
forces, a body will move in a straight line at constant velocity. This “law of inertia,” as
Newton called it, is preserved, mutatis mutandis, in general relativity, where inertial motion
is governed by the geodesic principle. The geodesic principle states that in the absence of
external forces, the possible trajectories through four dimensional spacetime of a massive test
point particle will be timelike geodesics—i.e., bodies will move along “locally straightest”
lines, without acceleration. In standard presentations of general relativity, the geodesic
principle is stated as a postulate (cf. Hawking and Ellis, 1973; Wald, 1984; Misner et al.,
1973; Malament, 2012b), much like Newton’s first law.1 However, shortly after Einstein
presented the theory, he and others began to suspect that one could equally well conceive of
the geodesic principle as a theorem, at least in the presence of other standard assumptions
of relativity theory (Eddington, 1924; Einstein and Grommer, 1927; Einstein et al., 1938).
This shift from geodesic-principle-as-postulate to geodesic-principle-as-theorem has led to
a widespread and deeply influential view that general relativity has a special explanatory
virtue that distinguishes it from other theories of space and time: in the words of Harvey
Brown, general relativity “...is the first in the long line of dynamical theories... that explains
inertial motion” (Brown, 2005, pg. 163). The view holds that Newtonian physics may
answer the “how” part of Aristotle’s question, but there is a sense in which only general
relativity answers the “why” part.
Although Einstein’s early attempts to prove the geodesic principle were not unambigu-
ously successful, more recent efforts have shown that there is a precise sense in which the
geodesic principle may be understood as a theorem of general relativity (Geroch and Jang,
1975).2 However, it turns out that relativity is not unique in this regard. Geometrized
1For a detailed and enlightening discussion of the status of the first law of motion in standard Newtonian
gravitation, see Earman and Friedman (1973).
2There have been several steps along the way to proving the geodesic principle as a rigorous theorem of
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Newtonian gravitation (sometimes, Newton-Cartan theory) is a reformulation of Newtonian
gravitation due to E´lie Cartan (1923, 1924) and Kurt Friedrichs (1927) that shares many
of the qualitative features of general relativity. In geometrized Newtonian gravitation one
represents space and time as a four dimensional spacetime manifold, the curvature of which
depends dynamically on the distribution of matter on the manifold. Gravitational influ-
ences, meanwhile, are not understood as forces, as in traditional formulations of Newtonian
gravitation; rather, they are a manifestation of the curvature of spacetime. And in par-
ticular, inertial motion is governed by the geodesic principle: in the absence of external
(non-gravitational) forces, bodies move along the geodesics of (curved) spacetime. Recently,
I have shown that the geodesic principle can be understood as a theorem of geometrized
Newtonian gravitation (Weatherall, 2011a). Mathematically, the Newtonian theorem is
nearly identical to the Geroch-Jang theorem. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, when
the background assumptions needed to prove these theorems are examined in the contexts
of each theory, one can reasonably conclude that the geodesic principle has essentially the
same status in both cases, though in neither theory is the situation as simple as one might
have hoped (Weatherall, 2011b).
One consequence of this recent work is that Einstein and others’ idea that the status
of the geodesic principle in general relativity distinguishes the theory from other theories
of space and time seems more difficult to hold on to. But it also raises a related issue.
When one attends carefully to the details of these theorems, several complications arise
general relativity. The most significant early attempt was the work of Einstein and Grommer (1927) and
Einstein et al. (1938), with subsequent work due to Taub (1962), Thomas (1962), Newman and Posadas
(1969, 1971), and Dixon (1964). These are described and criticized briefly in Geroch and Jang (1975) (see
also Blanchet (2000) and Damour (1989) for reviews of approaches to the “problem of motion” in general
relativity). There are currently two approaches to the problem that are widely recognized as successful:
the one developed by Geroch and Jang (see also Ehlers and Geroch, 2004), which will be my focus in the
present paper, and one developed by Sternberg (2003) and Souriau (1974), among others, which models a
massive test point particle as an order-zero distribution with support along a curve. One can then show that
if the distribution is (weakly) conserved, the curve must be a geodesic. Although the Geroch-Jang approach
and the Sternberg-Souriau approach are prima facie different, there is a sense in which they turn out to be
equivalent (Geroch and Weatherall, 2011).
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concerning the strength and status of the assumptions necessary for proving them. Given
these complications, one might reasonably ask, do either of these theories explain inertial
motion? It is this second question that I will take up in the present paper.3
I will begin with a brief overview of geometrized Newtonian gravitation, after which
I will review the relevant theorems concerning the geodesic principle in that theory and
general relativity. I will focus on the subtle ways in which the theorems differ, and on the
complications that arise when one tries to interpret them. Once this background material
has been laid out, I will turn to the question at hand. The starting point for this discussion
will be to observe that on one way of thinking about explanation in scientific theories,
the answer to the question is “no”: neither of these theories explains inertial motion, at
least if the assumptions going into the theorems have the character I describe. I want
to resist this view, however, because I think it takes for granted that one can make clear
distinctions between “levels” or “tiers” of fundamentality of the central principles of a theory.
Careful analysis of the geodesic principle theorems, meanwhile, suggests that there is another
way of thinking about how the principles of a theory fit together. The alternative view I
will develop—I will call it the “puzzle ball view” or, perhaps more precisely, the “puzzle
3The recent literature on whether and in what sense general relativity and Newtonian gravitation explain
inertial motion originates with Harvey Brown (2005). Brown is not especially concerned to give an “account”
of the sense of explanation he has in mind, in the sense of providing necessary or sufficient conditions for
when some argument, theorem, etc. is an explanation (nor, I should say, am I!), though the idea is that the
geodesic principle is explained in general relativity because there is a sense in which it is a consequence of the
central dynamical principle of the theory, Einstein’s equation. Ada´n Sus (2011) has expanded on this view,
calling the form of explanation at issue “dynamical explanation”, and further defending Brown’s claim that
general relativity is distinguished from other spacetime theories with regard to the explanation it provides
of inertial motion. David Malament (2012a) and I (Weatherall, 2012, 2011b), meanwhile, have pointed
out that the geodesic principle does not follow merely from Einstein’s equation, and that a strong energy
condition is also required; moreover, as I note above, a theorem remarkably similar to the one that holds
in the relativistic case also holds in geometrized Newtonian gravitation. But these latter discussions largely
set aside the question of what sense of explanation is at issue, if any. More recently, Mike Tamir (2011) has
pointed out that in general relativity, at least, the geodesic principle is false for realistic matter. He then
considers almost-geodesic motion as a kind of universal phenomenon in the sense of Batterman (2002). From
this latter perspective, these theorems provide explanations in the sense of showing how certain behavior
can be expected to arise approximately for a wide variety of substances. The remarks in the present paper
are of a rather different character than (most of) this earlier work, and so I will not engage with it closely
in the text.
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ball conjecture”—holds that the foundations of physical theories, or at least these physical
theories, are best conceived as a network of mutually interdependent principles, rather than
as a collection of independent and explanatorily fundamental “axioms” or “postulates”. On
this view, one way to provide a satisfactory explanation of a central principle of a theory,
such as the geodesic principle in general relativity or geometrized Newtonian gravitation,
would be to exhibit its dependence on the other central principles of the theory, i.e., to show
how the principle-to-be-explained is a consequence of the other central principles and basic
assumptions of the theory. And this is precisely what the theorems I will describe do. And
so, I will argue that there is a sense in which both theories explain inertial motion, though
some care is required to say what is meant by “explain” in this context.
I should be clear from the start: the language of explanation is a convenient one, but
I am not ultimately interested in the semantics of the word “explain”. The goal is not to
argue whether one thing or another is really an explanation. The dialectic, rather, is as
follows. Many people have suggested that general relativity provides an important kind
of insight with regard to inertial motion, something to be valued and sought after in our
physical theories. One might call this thing an “explanation”, or not. The point, though, is
that when one looks in detail at just what one gets in relativity theory (and in geometrized
Newtonian gravitation), it seems to work in a different way than one might have initially
guessed it would. One response to this observation would be to say that we have not actually
gotten what we were promised—or, in the language above, that general relativity does not
explain inertial motion. But another response is to try to better understand what we do get.
My principal thesis is that if one takes this second path, an alternative picture emerges of
how the foundations of theories work. And on this alternative picture, general relativity and
geometrized Newtonian gravitation both do provide an important and very useful kind of
insight into inertial motion, and more, there are clear reasons why one should value and seek
out this sort of insight. Indeed, one might even think that what we ultimately get is what
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we should have wanted in the first place. I am inclined to use the word “explanation” for
this sort of insight, but fully recognize that this usage may seem non-standard or incorrect
to some readers.
2. Overview of geometrized Newtonian gravitation
Geometrized Newtonian gravitation is best understood as a translation of Newtonian grav-
itation into the language of general relativity, a way of making Newtonian physics look as
much like general relativity as possible, for the purposes of addressing comparative ques-
tions about the two theories.4 The result is a theory that is strikingly similar in many
qualitative respects to general relativity, but which differs in certain crucial details. Recall
that in general relativity, a relativistic spacetime is an ordered pair (M, gab), where M is a
smooth four dimensional manifold and gab is a smooth Lorentzian metric on the manifold.
In geometrized Newtonian gravitation, meanwhile, one similarly starts with a smooth four
dimensional manifold M , but one endows this manifold with a different metric structure.
Specifically, one defines two (degenerate) metrics. One, a temporal metric tab, has signature
(1, 0, 0, 0). It is used to assign temporal lengths to vectors on M : the temporal length of
a vector ξa at a point p is (tabξ
aξb)1/2. Vectors with non-zero temporal length are called
timelike; otherwise, they are called spacelike. The second metric is a spatial metric hab, with
signature (0, 1, 1, 1). In general one requires that these two metrics satisfy an orthogonality
condition, habtab = 0. It is important that the temporal metric is written with covariant
indices and the spatial metric with contravariant indices: since both metrics have degener-
ate signatures, they are not invertible, and so in general one cannot use either to raise or
lower indices. In particular, this means that the spatial metric cannot be used to assign
spatial lengths to vectors directly. Instead, one uses the following indirect method. Given a
4This brief overview of geometrized Newtonian gravitation is neither systematic or complete. The best
available treatment of the subject is given in Malament (2012b); see also Trautman (1965). My notation
and conventions here follow Malament’s.
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spacelike vector ξa, one can show that there always exists a (non-unique) covector ua such
that ξa = habub. One then defines the spatial length of ξ
a to be (habuaub)
1/2, which can be
shown to be independent of the choice of ua.
Given a Lorentzian metric gab on a manifold M , there always exists a unique covariant
derivative operator ∇ that is compatible with gab in the sense that ∇agbc = 0. This does
not hold for the degenerate Newtonian metrics. Instead, there are an uncountably infinite
collection of derivative operators that satisfy the compatibility conditions ∇atbc = 0 and
∇ahbc = 0. This means that to identify a model of geometrized Newtonian gravitation, one
needs to specify a derivative operator in addition to the metric fields. Thus, we define a
classical spacetime as an ordered quadruple (M, tab, h
ab,∇), where M , tab, hab, and ∇ are
as described, the metrics satisfy the orthogonality condition, and the metrics and derivative
operator satisfy the compatibility conditions. A classical spacetime is the analog of a rel-
ativistic spacetime. Note that the signature of tab guarantees that at any point p, one can
find a covector ta such that tab = tatb; in cases where such a field can be defined globally,
we call the associated spacetime temporally orientable. In what follows, we will always re-
strict attention to temporally orientable spacetimes, and will replace tab with ta whenever
we specify a classical spacetime.
In both theories, timelike curves—curves whose tangent vector field is always timelike—
represent the possible trajectories of point particles (and idealized observers). And as in
general relativity, matter fields in geometrized Newtonian gravitation are represented by
a smooth symmetric rank-2 field T ab (with contravariant indices). In general relativity,
this field is called the energy-momentum tensor ; in geometrized Newtonian gravitation, it is
called the mass-momentum tensor. The reason for the difference concerns the interpretations
of the fields. In relativity theory, the four-momentum density of a matter field with energy-
momentum tensor T ab is only defined relative to some observer’s state of motion: given an
observer whose worldline has (timelike) tangent field ξa, the four-momentum density P a
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as determined by the observer is given by P a = T abξb. When P
a is timelike or null, one
can define the mass density ρ of the field at a point, relative to the observer, as the length
of P a. Moreover, the four-momentum field can be further decomposed (relative to ξa) as
P a = Eξa+pa, where E = P nξn is the relative energy density as determined by the observer,
and pa = P n(δan− ξaξn) is the relative three-momentum density. Thus, the field T ab encodes
the relative mass, relative energy, and relative momentum densities as determined by any
observer. In geometrized Newtonian gravitation, meanwhile, all observers make the same
determination of the four-momentum density of a matter field at a point: for any observer,
P a is given by P a = T abtb. Given a particular observer whose worldline has tangent field ξ
a,
though, one can decompose P a as P a = ρξa+pa, where ρ = P ata(= T
abtatb) is the (observer-
independent) mass density associated with the matter field, and where pa = P n(δan − ξatn)
is the relative three-momentum density of the matter field as determined by the observer.
Thus in geometrized Newtonian gravitation, T ab encodes the (absolute) mass density of a
matter field, as well as its momentum relative to any observer.5
It is standard in both theories to limit attention to matter fields that satisfy several
additional constraints. In particular, in both cases one assumes that matter fields satisfy the
conservation condition, which states that their energy/mass-momentum fields are divergence
free (i.e., ∇aT ab = 0). One also usually requires that such fields satisfy various energy
conditions. In geometrized Newtonian gravitation, only one such condition is standard: it
is the so-called mass condition.
Mass condition: A mass-momentum field satisfies the mass condition if, at any
point, either T ab = 0 or T abtatb > 0.
Since T abtatb = ρ is the mass density, this assumption states that whenever the mass-
5Note that is general relativity, one makes a distinction between the mass and energy densities relative
to a given observer, where relative mass density is the length of the four-momentum density determined by
an observer at a point (ρ = (P aPa)
1/2) and relative energy density is E = T abξaξb = P
aξa, where ξ
a is the
tangent field to the observer’s worldline. In geometrized Newtonian gravitation, this distinction collapses:
both (absolute) mass density and (absolute) energy density are given by ρ = T abtatb = P
atb.
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momentum tensor is non-vanishing, the associated matter field has positive mass. The
situation is more complicated in general relativity, where there are several energy conditions
that one may consider. I will mention a few because they are of particular interest for present
purposes. One, called the weak energy condition, is (at least prima facie) quite similar to
the mass condition it states that the energy density of a matter field as determined by any
observer is always non-negative.
Weak energy condition: An energy-momentum field satisfies the weak energy
condition if, give any timelike vector ξa at a point, T abξaξb ≥ 0.
It is also common to consider stronger conditions. For instance, there are the dominant
energy condition and the strengthened dominant energy condition:
Dominant Energy Condition: An energy-momentum field satisfies the dom-
inant energy condition if, given any timelike vector ξa at a point, T
abξaξb ≥ 0
and T abξa is timelike or null.
Strengthened Dominant Energy Condition: An energy-momentum field
satisfies the strengthened dominant energy condition if, give any timelike covector
ξa at any point in M , T
abξaξb ≥ 0 and either T ab = 0 or T abξa is timelike.
If these two conditions obtain for some matter field, then not only do all observers take the
field to have non-negative energy density, they also take its four-momentum to be causal or
timelike (respectively). In other words, these latter conditions capture the requirement that
matter must propagate at or below the speed of light.
The curvature of a classical spacetime is defined in the standard way: given a derivative
operator ∇, the Riemann curvature tensor Rabcd is the unique tensor field such that for any
vector field ξa, Rabcdξ
b = −2∇[c∇d]ξa. The Ricci curvature tensor, meanwhile, is given by
Rab = R
n
abn. In both contexts, one says that a spacetime is flat if R
a
bcd = 0; in geometrized
Newtonian gravitation, one also says that a (possibly curved) spacetime is spatially flat if
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Rabcd = Ramnoh
bmhcnhdo = 0 or, equivalently, Rmnh
mahnb = 0. Given these ingredients,
one can state the sense in which in geometrized Newtonian gravitation, the curvature of
spacetime depends on the distribution of matter: namely, the central dynamical principle
of the theory, the geometrized Poisson equation, states that Rab = 4piρtatb, where ρ is
the mass-density defined above. This expression explicitly relates the Ricci curvature of
spacetime to the distribution of matter. It is the Newtonian analogue of Einstein’s equation,
Rab = 8pi(Tab − 12Tgab), where T = T abgab, or equivalently 8piTab = Rab − 12Rgab, where
R = Rabg
ab.
There are a few points to emphasize here concerning the geometrized Poisson equation.
For one, if the geometrized Poisson equation holds of a classical spacetime for some mass-
momentum tensor T ab, then the classical spacetime is spatially flat, since Rnmh
nahmb =
4piρtntmh
mahnb = 0. This fact is a way of recovering a familiar feature of Newtonian grav-
itation, namely that space is always flat, even though in the geometrized theory spacetime
may be curved. Second, in general relativity one can freely think of both the metric and
the derivative operator as (systemically related) dynamical variables in the theory. In ge-
ometrized Newtonian gravitation, this is not the case: instead, the metrical structure of a
classical spacetime is fixed, and only the derivative operator (or more specifically, the Ricci
curvature, which is defined in terms of the derivative operator) is a dynamic variable. Fi-
nally, there is a sense in which, given some matter distribution, the geometrized Poisson
equation “fixes” a derivative operator on a classical spacetime, but one has to be careful,
as one can typically only recover a unique derivative operator satisfying the geometrized
Possion equation for a given matter distribution in the presence of additional boundary
conditions or other assumptions.
The geometrized Poisson equation provides the sense in which in geometrized Newtonian
gravitation, spacetime is curved in the presence of matter; the sense in which gravitational
effects may be understood as a manifestation of this curvature is just the same as in general
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relativity. That is, a derivative operator allows one to define a class of geometrically privi-
leged curves, the geodesics of the spacetime, which consist of all curves whose tangent fields
ξa satisfy ξn∇nξa = 0 everywhere. I have already said that the timelike curves of a spacetime
represent the possible trajectories for massive particles; the timelike geodesics, meanwhile,
represent the possible unaccelerated trajectories of particles in both theories. The geodesic
principle then connects these geometrically privileged curves with force-free motion. Thus,
in geometrized Newtonian gravitation, as in general relativity, the distribution of matter
throughout space and time affects the possible trajectories of massive point particles not by
causing such particles to accelerate, but rather by dynamically determining a collection of
unaccelerated curves.
These features of geometrized Newtonian gravitation provide the sense in which the the-
ory is qualitatively similar to general relativity. But one might wonder what undergirds the
implicit claim that geometrized Newtonian gravitation is in some sense Newtonian. One
sense in which the theory is Newtonian is immediate: the degenerate metric structure of
a classical spacetime captures the implicit geometry of space and time in ordinary Newto-
nian gravitation, where one has a temporally ordered succession of flat three dimensional
manifolds representing space at various times (cf. Stein, 1967). But there is more to say.
In standard formulations of Newtonian gravitation, spacetime is flat. Gravitation is a force
mediated by a gravitational potential, which in turn is related to the distribution of matter
by Poisson’s equation. In the present four dimensional geometrical language, this can be
expressed as follows. We begin with a classical spacetime (M, ta, h
ab,∇) as before, but now
we require that ∇ is flat, i.e., Rabcd = 0. We again represent matter by its mass-momentum
field T ab, defined just as above, but we also define a scalar field ϕ, which is the gravitational
potential. Poisson’s equation is written as ∇a∇aϕ = 4piρ where the index on ∇a is raised
using hab, and where ρ = T abtatb. And now the acceleration of a massive test point particle
in the presence of a gravitational potential ϕ is given by ξn∇nξa = −∇aϕ, where ξa is
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the tangent to the particle’s trajectory. In other words, in standard Newtonian gravitation
matter accelerates in the presence of mass.
It turns out that standard Newtonian gravitation (thus understood) and geometrized
Newtonian gravitation are systematically related (Malament, 2012b, ch. 4.2). Specifically,
given a classical spacetime (M, ta, h
ab,∇) with∇ flat, a smooth mass density ρ, and a smooth
gravitational potential ϕ satisfying ∇a∇aϕ = 4piρ, there always exists a unique derivative
operator ∇˜ such that (M, ta, hab, ∇˜) is a classical spacetime, R˜ab = 4piρtatb, and such that
for any timelike vector field ξa, ξn∇nξa = −∇aϕ if and only if ξn∇˜nξa = 0. In other words,
given a model of standard Newtonian gravitation, there is always a model of geometrized
Newtonian gravitation with precisely the same mass density and allowed trajectories. Ad-







b. This result is known as the Trautman geometrization lemma; it pro-
vides the sense in which one can always translate from standard Newtonian gravitation into
the geometrized theory. One can also prove a corresponding recovery lemma (also due to
Trautman), allowing for translations back: namely, given a classical spacetime (M, ta, h
ab, ∇˜)
and smooth mass density ρ satisfying R˜ab = 4piρtatb, if R˜
ab









there always exists a flat derivative operator ∇ and a gravitational potential ϕ such that
(M, ta, h
ab,∇) is a classical spacetime, ∇a∇aϕ = 4piρ, and again for any timelike vector field
ξa, ξn∇nξa = −∇aϕ if and only if ξn∇˜nξa = 0. Note that this recovery result only holds in
the presence of the two additional curvature conditions stated above; moreover, in general
the translation from geometrized Newtonian gravitation to standard Newtonian gravitation
will not be unique. (See figure 1.)
3. The geodesic principle as a theorem
With the background of the previous section in place, I can now state the precise sense








Figure 1: In general it is possible to translate between geometrized Newtonian gravitation and standard
Newtonian gravitation, as depicted in this figure. On the left is a model of standard Newtonian gravitation:
one has a matter field represented by the world-tube of some body, such as the sun, and a curve orbiting
this body, representing, say, a small planet. This curve corresponds to an allowed trajectory insofar as it is
accelerating by the appropriate amount. On the right is the corresponding model of geometrized Newtonian
gravitation. One has precisely the same matter distribution, and the same allowed trajectory (i.e., the same
orbit), but now we understand this trajectory to be allowed by the theory because it is a geodesic of a curved
derivative operator, with curvature determined by the matter distribution. Note that both theories have the
same metrical structure, represented here by a succession of flat slices representing space at various times.
geometrized Newtonian gravitation. I will begin by stating both theorems, and then double
back to the question of how one should interpret them.
Theorem 3.1. (Geroch and Jang, 1975)6Let (M, gab) be a relativistic spacetime, and
suppose M is oriented. Let γ : I → M be a smooth imbedded curve. Suppose that given
any open subset O of M containing γ[I], there exists a smooth symmetric field T ab with the
following properties.
1. T ab satisfies the strengthened dominant energy condition, i.e., given any timelike cov-
ector ξa at any point in M , T
abξaξb ≥ 0 and either T ab = 0 or T abξa is timelike;
2. T ab satisfies the conservation condition, i.e., ∇aT ab = 0;
3. supp(T ab) ⊂ O; and
4. there is at least one point in O at which T ab 6= 0.
Then γ is a timelike curve that can be reparametrized as a geodesic.
One can prove an almost identical theorem in geometrized Newtonian gravitation.
6This particular statement of the theorem is heavily indebted to Malament (2012b, Prop. 2.5.2).
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Theorem 3.2. (Weatherall, 2011a) Let (M, tab, h
ab,∇) be a classical spacetime, and
suppose that M is oriented. Suppose also that Rabcd = 0. Let γ : I → M be a smooth
imbedded curve. Suppose that given any open subset O of M containing γ[I], there exists a
smooth symmetric field T ab with the following properties.
1. T ab satisfies the mass condition, i.e., whenever T ab 6= 0, T abtatb > 0;
2. T ab satisfies the conservation condition, i.e., ∇aT ab = 0;
3. supp(T ab) ⊂ O; and
4. there is at least one point in O at which T ab 6= 0.
Then γ is a timelike curve that can be reparametrized as a geodesic.
As a first remark, it may not be obvious that either of these theorems should be under-
stood to capture the geodesic principle at all, at least in a natural way. A principal difficulty
in trying to derive the geodesic principle as a theorem concerns a kind of ontological mis-
match between the geodesic principle and the rest of general relativity: namely, general
relativity is a field theory, whereas the geodesic principle is a statement concerning point
particles. One strategy for dealing with this problem is to try to model massive point parti-
cles as “small” bits of extended matter, and then try to show that under sufficiently general
assumptions, the world tubes of such small bits of matter will contain timelike geodesics.
But this turns out to be false in general—geodesic motion only obtains in the idealized
limit where the worldtube of a body collapses to a curve, in which case one can no longer
represent matter as a smooth field on spacetime.7 The Geroch-Jang strategy, meanwhile, is
different. Instead of starting with some matter and asking what kind of trajectory it follows,
one starts with a curve and asks under what circumstances that curve can be understood
as a trajectory for arbitrarily small bits of extended matter. Both theorems then state that
the only curves along which arbitrarily small bits of matter can be constructed are timelike
geodesics.
Importantly, one represents a “small bit of matter” by a smooth symmetric rank 2 tensor
fields with support in some neighborhood of the curve. But a curve is not understood as
7This point is emphasized by Tamir (2011).
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a possible trajectory for a free massive test point particle if one can construct any smooth
symmetric rank 2 tensor field in arbitrarily small neighborhoods of the curve—rather, one
limits attention to fields that satisfy additional constraints. The claim, then, is that these
theorems capture the geodesic principle in both theories insofar as the additional constraints
on the matter fields adequately capture what we intend by “free massive test matter”. This
means that the interpretation of the theorems turns on the status of these conditions. And
so, for a comparative study of the status of the geodesic principle in each theory, one wants
to compare the status of each of these assumptions relative to their respective theories.
Two of the assumptions can be set aside immediately: in both theorems, assumptions (3)
and (4) play the role of setting up the limiting process implicit in the theorems. Assumption
(3) limits attention to matter fields that vanish outside one’s chosen neighborhood of the
curve (which captures the sense in which one is considering arbitrarily small bits of matter
propagating along the curve), and assumption (4) indicates that the matter field must be
non-vanishing somewhere along curve, ruling out the trivial case. These assumptions are
identical in both cases, and neither is troublingly strong. There is also an obvious difference
that can be safely ignored. In the Newtonian theorem, we place an additional constraint on
the curvature, namely Rabcd = 0. This is precisely the curvature condition needed to prove
the Trautman recovery theorem, allowing one to translate from a model of geometrized
Newtonian gravitation to a model of standard Newtonian gravitation. For this reason,
the curvature condition is naturally interpreted as a restriction to models of geometrized
Newtonian gravitation that are Newtonian, in the sense that they admit translations back to
models of standard Newtonian gravitation. This presumably is the case of greatest interest,
and so I am inclined to think of the assumption as benign.8 Moreover, there is good reason
to think that this assumption can be dropped, though to my knowledge, proving as much is
still an open (and perhaps interesting) problem.
8For another view on this matter, see Sus (2011).
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The most striking difference between the two theorems concerns the respective assump-
tions (1). In the Newtonian theorem, this is the mass condition, i.e., that whenever the
mass-momentum field is non-vanishing, the mass density determined by any observer must
be positive. This is the standard energy condition in geometrized Newtonian gravitation,
and more, it is natural in this context, as it captures the sense in which the bits of matter
being represented are massive. In the Geroch-Jang theorem, meanwhile, one requires the
strengthened dominant energy condition, which states that (a) all observers must assign
non-negative (mass-)energy density to the matter field (the weak energy condition) and (b)
that if T ab 6= 0, then the four-momentum assigned to the matter field by any observer must
by timelike. It seems natural to think that the weak energy condition, (a), is playing the
role played by the mass condition in the Newtonian case: namely, it captures the sense in
which the small bits of matter are massive, by requiring that they always have non-negative
mass. But from this perspective, the second part of the condition, (b), is a strong additional
requirement. In Newtonian gravitation, it would seem, one needs only to assume that mass
is always positive to get timelike geodesic propagation, whereas in general relativity, one
also needs to make an assumption about the timelike propagation of matter.9
However, the situation is not quite so simple as this. Although the mass condition appears
to be nothing more than an assumption about positive mass, it, too, contains an implicit
assumption about timelike propagation. To see this, consider a different (non-standard)
Newtonian energy condition, which I will call the weakened mass condition.
Weakened Mass Condition: A mass-momentum field T ab satisfies the weak-
ened mass condition if at any point, T abtatb ≥ 0.
The weakened mass condition has a good claim on being the Newtonian analogue of the
weak energy condition and might similarly be understood as the claim that mass/energy
9This is precisely how I present the situation in Weatherall (2011b) and Weatherall (2012). However,
I now think matters are still more complicated than I indicate there, as I explain in the text. Still, the
principal morals of those previous discussions are unchanged by these additional considerations.
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density is always non-negative. But it is strictly weaker than the mass condition, since the
weakened mass condition may be satisfied by mass-momentum fields that are spacelike, in
the sense that T ab 6= 0 but T abtatb = 0 (for example, consider T ab = uaub, with ua a spacelike
vector field). In other words, the mass condition amounts to the weakened mass condition
plus the additional assumption that T ab is timelike. We can make this explicit by defining
an equivalent condition, the modified mass condition.
Modified Mass Condition: A mass-momentum field T ab satisfies the modified
mass condition if at any point, T abtatb ≥ 0 and either T ab = 0 or T abta is timelike.
The modified mass condition is equivalent to the mass condition, but would appear to be
the natural translation of the strengthened dominant energy condition. On the other hand,
one can also rewrite the weak energy condition as the strengthened weak energy condition.
Strengthened Weak Energy Condition: An energy-momentum field satisfies
the strengthened weak energy condition if, give any timelike vector ξa at a point,
either T ab = 0 or T abξaξb > 0.
stating that for all timelike ξa, if T ab 6= 0, then T abξaξb > 0. And this condition seems like
the natural translation of the (standard) mass condition, but it is strictly weaker than the
strengthened dominant energy condition!10
This situation is summarized in table 1.
There are thus two ways of thinking about the relationship between the energy conditions
used in these theorems, depending on which “natural translations” one emphasizes. On one
way of thinking, the mass condition is essentially the same as the strengthened weak energy
10The strengthened weak energy condition is also strictly weaker than the (strict) dominant energy con-
dition, and so Prop. 4 of Weatherall (2012) implies that the strengthened dominant energy condition is not
strong enough to prove the Geroch-Jang theorem.
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Geometrized Newtonian gravitation General relativity
Modified mass condition ←→ Strengthened dom. energy condition
m ⇓
Mass condition ←→ Strengthened weak energy condition
⇓ ⇓
Weakened mass condition ←→ Weak energy condition
Table 1: This table summarizes the relationship between the various energy condition discussed in the text.
Single arrows represent “apparently natural translations”; double arrows represent logical implications.
condition. From this point of view, then, the strengthened dominant energy condition in the
Geroch-Jang theorem is a strictly stronger assumption than the corresponding assumption
in Theorem 3.2. More, one might be inclined to think that one gets something additional
for free in the Newtonian case, since the mass condition turns out to imply the (apparently)
stronger modified mass condition, whereas the strengthened weak energy condition does not
imply the strengthened dominant energy condition. Meanwhile, on the other way of thinking
about things, one argues that the strengthened dominant energy condition is essentially the
same as the modified mass condition, which is fully equivalent to the mass condition. And
so one concludes that the energy conditions required by the two theorems are essentially the
same.
There is also another possibility, which is to say that one cannot perform simple transla-
tions between the energy conditions in these two theories at all. I am inclined to endorse this
last option, though this raises new questions about how one should compare the theorems.
There are a few things to say. First, irrespective of how one tries (or does not try) to trans-
late these conditions, there are still two senses in which the strengthened dominant energy
condition is stronger than the mass condition. One is that the timelike propagation clause of
the strengthened dominant energy condition can be understood as the assumption that the
instantaneous speed of matter, relative to any observer, must be strictly less than the speed
of light. The corresponding clause of the (modified) mass condition, meanwhile, amounts
to the assumption that matter cannot propagate at infinite speed relative to any observer.
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And the assumption that a number must be less than a fixed finite value is stronger than
the assumption that it must be finite, but not bounded.
The second, more significant sense in which the strengthened dominant energy condition
is stronger is that the only way in which matter in Newtonian gravitation can be “massive”
(i.e., have positive mass as determined by some observer) is if it satisfies the mass condition.
Matter that satisfies the weakened mass condition but not the mass condition will necessar-
ily have zero mass. And so one might argue that the mass condition is necessary to capture
what is meant by “massive” in the context of Newtonian gravitation. In general relatively,
meanwhile, matter can be “massive” in two senses, without satisfying the strengthened dom-
inant energy condition: it can be massive in the sense that it has positive (mass-)energy
density (i.e., it satisfies the weak energy condition), and it can be massive in the sense that
some observers will assign it positive mass density (i.e., the relative four-momentum density
as determined by some observers is timelike). This second sense trades on an important dis-
tinction between some observers assigning positive mass density and all observers assigning
positive mass density. One might have thought that in order for a matter field to be massive,
it would be sufficient if some observers, perhaps privileged—say co-moving observers making
determinations of “rest mass density”, when that makes sense—and perhaps not, determine
that the field has positive mass density. But the strengthened dominant energy condition
requires considerably more than this. In geometrized Newtonian gravitation, meanwhile, all
of these distinction collapse. If anyone determines a matter field has positive mass, then
everyone does.
A final remark is that, understood within the context of the respective theories, the
strengthened dominant energy condition is a more surprising assumption to have to make
than the mass condition. One often thinks of relativity theory as forbidding superluminal
propagation of matter, in the sense that somehow the geometric structure of the theory
renders superluminal matter incoherent. But here, at least, it seems that we need to rule
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out superluminal propagation of matter as an additional assumption in order to derive
the geodesic principle. This point can be made precise by asking whether one can drop
or weaken the energy condition in the Geroch-Jang theorem and still derive the geodesic
principle. And the answer is “no”. If one drops the energy condition altogether, it is possible
to construct bits of matter that propagate along any timelike curve (Malament, 2012a). And
if one weakens the energy condition to the weak energy condition or the dominant energy
condition, one can construct bits of matter that propagate along spacelike or null curves,
respectively (Weatherall, 2012). To be sure, in the Newtonian case the mass condition
is similarly necessary (the considerations offered in Weatherall (2012) can be adapted to
show that the weakened mass condition is not enough to get timelike geodesic motion in
geometrized Newtonian gravitation), but this does not seem as striking, since one does not
expect Newtonian gravitation to imply restrictions on the propagation of matter, even if it
is standard to assume that matter cannot propagate instantaneously in the theory.
This leaves the conservation condition, assumption (2) in both theorems. The statement
of the assumption is identical in both cases, namely that the tensor fields representing
matter must divergence free. And in both theories, this assumption is a way of capturing
that the bits of matter must be free in the sense of non-interacting. This interpretation is
justified because in both theories there is a standard background assumption that at every
point of spacetime, total energy/mass-momentum must be divergence free, and more, that a
particular energy/mass-momentum field fails to be divergence free at a point just in case it
is interacting with some other such field at that point. And so, to say that a particular field
satisfies the conservation condition everywhere is to say that that field cannot be exchanging
energy/mass-momentum with any other fields.
So far, it would seem that these assumptions have precisely the same status in both theo-
rems. But this is too quick. Although the assumptions are equally natural ways of capturing
the desired sense of “free” in both theorems, they only have that interpretation in the pres-
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ence of the background assumption regarding the local conservation of total energy/mass-
momentum. And there is an argument to be made that this background assumption has a
different status in general relativity than in geometrized Newtonian gravitation. In general
relativity, Einstein’s equation implies the conservation condition, at least for total source
matter. This is because the equation can be written as 8piT ab = Rab − 1
2
gabR, and it is a
brute geometrical fact (known as Bianchi’s identity) that the right-hand side of this equa-
tion is always divergence free. Thus, the left-hand side must also be divergence free. The
geometrized Poisson equation, however, does not imply the conservation condition. And so,
if one has Einstein’s equation lurking in the background, one might be inclined to say that
the background assumption that matter is conserved comes for free in general relativity,
whereas it is an additional brute assumption in geometrized Newtonian gravitation. There
is an important caveat here—the argument that Einstein’s equation implies the conserva-
tion condition only applies for source matter, whereas the geodesic principle is supposed to
govern test matter, i.e., matter that is not treated as a source in Einstein’s equation—but
nonetheless, one might think that the conservation condition has a special status—even,
to anticipate the discussion in the next section, a privileged explanatory status—in general
relativity because of its relation to Einstein’s equation.11
In the next section, I will turn to the question of whether either of these theorems should
count as explanations of inertial motion. But before I do so, it will be helpful to sum
up the discussion in the present section. I have now made precise the sense in which one
can prove the geodesic principle as a theorem of both general relativity and geometrized
11I should emphasize: one does not need to think of the conservation condition as having a different status
in general relativity than in geometrized Newtonian gravitation. For instance, I have elsewhere argued that
one can think of the conservation condition as a meta-principle, in the sense that the assumption that
matter is conserved is expected to hold true in a wide variety of theories, and that from this perspective the
status of the assumption is much the same in both general relativity and geometrized Newtonian gravitation
(Weatherall, 2011b). (Of course, the assumption that a matter field is divergence free is not exactly the
same as the assumption that total mass or energy is constant over time, but it does deserve to be called the
relativistic version of traditional conservation principles.)
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Newtonian gravitation. But, as I hope has become clear, interpreting and comparing these
theorems is quite subtle. It is not quite right to say that the theorems have the same
interpretation or significance: on the one hand, there is arguably a sense in which the
conservation condition, necessary for both theorems, has a different and perhaps privileged
status in general relativity; and on the other hand, there are several senses in which the
energy condition required for Geroch-Jang theorem is stronger than the condition required
for the Newtonian theorem, both in absolute terms and relative to the respective theories.
Despite these differences, however, there is at least one important sense in which the status
of the geodesic principle is strikingly similar in both theories. In both cases, one can prove
the geodesic principle as a theorem. But to do so, one needs to make strong assumptions
about the nature of matter. The status of these assumption will play a central role in what
follows.
4. Explaining inertial motion?
General relativity and geometrized Newtonian gravitation, like any physical theory, involve
a number of basic assumptions and central principles. For instance, general relativity begins
with some background assumptions about matter and geometry: space and time are repre-
sented by a four dimensional, possibly curved Lorentzian manifold; matter is represented by
its energy-momentum tensor, a smooth symmetric rank two field on spacetime. One then
adds some additional assumptions, as principles indicating how to interpret and use the
theory. One may stipulate that total energy-momentum at a point must satisfy the conser-
vation condition. One assumes that matter fields satisfy various possible energy conditions,
that idealized clocks measure proper time along their trajectories, and that free massive test
point particles traverse timelike geodesics. We postulate a dynamical relationship between
the geometrical structure of spacetime and the energy-momentum field. And so on. Some of
these assumptions involve stipulating kinematical structure; others involve basic constraints
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and dynamical relationships; others still tell us how to extract empirical content from the
theory. All of them have some claim to centrality or fundamentality in the theory.
But they are not necessarily independent. For instance, as I mention above, the con-
servation condition may be understood as a consequence of Einstein’s equation, at least for
source matter. And so, at least in some contexts, one might want to think of the conserva-
tion condition as somehow subordinate to Einstein’s equation. One might even be inclined
to say that it is Einstein’s equation that really deserves to be called the “fundamental prin-
ciple,” while the conservation condition has some other, less fundamental status—or, in
other words, that Einstein’s equation explains why matter is locally conserved. We might
even say that this is what it means to say that something like the conservations condition
is explained by a theory: it can be derived from more fundamental principles in the theory.
From this point of view, one might have thought that when Einstein, Eddington, and
others have claimed that general relativity explains inertial motion, in the sense that one
can prove the geodesic principle as a theorem, the claim would have been analogous to what
I have just said about the conservation condition: namely, one can take some collection of
other principles of the theory and use them to derive the geodesic principle. One might
then think that the geodesic principle has the same subordinate status as the conservation
condition. It may be central to the theory, but not truly fundamental. The fundamental
principles are the ones that go into proving the geodesic principle. On this view, one thinks
of the foundations of general relativity as a two-tiered system. On the top tier are the truly
fundamental principles; on the lower tier are the other central principles that can be derived
from the top-tier principles. Initially, perhaps, one thought that the geodesic principle and
conservation condition were top-tier principles; but the Geroch-Jang theorem and Bianchi’s
identity show that they are really second-tier principles.12
12Indeed, it seems Einstein originally did think of the conservation condition as a top-tier principle, in
the sense that he thought it was an independent assumption that any realistic field equation would need to
be compatible with. See Earman and Glymour (1978a,b).
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Thinking this way can lead to problems, however. The main moral of the last section was
that although one can prove the geodesic principle as a theorem in both general relativity
and geometrized Newtonian gravitation, to do so one requires strong assumptions about the
nature of matter. And so, if we want to move the geodesic principle to the lower tier, it
would seem that we need to understand these assumptions as as top-tier principles. But this
raises a question: why should we think of these principles as the truly fundamental ones?
Or more specifically, why should we think of the conservation condition and the respective
energy conditions as more fundamental than the geodesic principle itself?
If one were committed to the idea that the geodesic principle is a second-tier principle
in one or both of these theories, perhaps one would be willing to include the assumptions
needed to prove the geodesic principle among the truly fundamental principles of that theory.
But it is hard to see how this is an appealing move on independent grounds. Even if one
were to argue that dynamical principles such as Einstein’s equation and the geometrized
Poisson equation are clearly more fundamental than the geodesic principle, it remains the
case that the strong energy condition needed to prove the Geroch-Jang theorem is entirely
independent of Einstein’s equation. (And neither assumption follows from the geometrized
Poisson equation.) More, there is a sense in which one can draw all of the inferential
arrows in the opposite direction, at least in one important case. Consider an energy/mass-
momentum field of the form T ab = ρξaξb, for some smooth scalar field ρ and smooth vector
field ξa. An energy/mass-momentum field of this form is the natural way of representing a
matter field composed of mutually non-interacting massive point particles (at least when ρ
is non-negative). And so, since the geodesic principle governs the behavior of free massive
test point particles, we can use it to derive features of this matter field: specifically, the
geodesic principle implies that the flow-lines of the field, which represent the trajectories of
each speck of dust, must be timelike geodesics. These flow lines are just the integral curves
of ξa, and so it follows that ξa must be timelike and geodesic (i.e., ξn∇nξa = 0). But if ξa
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is timelike, then T ab satisfies the strengthened dominant energy condition (or respectively,
the mass condition in geometrized Newtonian gravitation). And if it is geodesic, then T ab is
divergence free. Thus the geodesic principle allows us to derive that matter fields consisting
of non-interacting massive test point particles satisfy precisely the two conditions we need
to assume in order to prove the geodesic principle.13
So perhaps we should not be so quick to declare the conservation condition and energy
conditions top-tier in either theory. At very least, it is not perfectly clear that these assump-
tions are more fundamental than the geodesic principle. But thinking in this way might lead
one to conclude that neither of the geodesic principle theorems has much explanatory signif-
icance, since (the intuition might go) explanations always proceed from more fundamental
or basic facts to less fundamental facts. Here, meanwhile, the arrows of fundamentality are
muddled. And this would mean that not only is general relativity not special with regard
to its explanation of inertial motion—it does not explain inertial motion at all!
5. The puzzle ball conjecture
I do not find the argument I offer in the previous section compelling. It rests on a basic
intuition: to explain something like the geodesic principle, one must begin with some truly
fundamental principles and then provide an argument for why the principle-to-be-explained
must follow from these more fundamental ones. This intuition takes for granted that we
can make sense of a distinction between different tiers of fundamentality among the central
principles of a theory like general relativity or geometrized Newtonian gravitation. And I
think that this is a mistake—or at least, that there is a more compelling way of thinking
about things.
Consider what the geodesic principle theorems do accomplish. In both of these cases,
13Of course, the present argument does not imply that the conservation condition and energy conditions
hold for all matter—just for the type of matter directly governed by the geodesic principle.
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the theorems show how in the presence of other basic assumptions of the respective theories,
the geodesic principle follows. Or in other words, they show that given that one is com-
mitted to the rest of (say) general relativity, one must also be committed to the geodesic
principle. One cannot freely change the geodesic principle without also changing the rest of
general relaitivty: one cannot “fiddle” with the theory by (merely) replacing the geodesic
principle with the assumption that free massive test point particles traverse some other class
of curves—uniformly accelerating curves, say, or spacelike curves. The geodesic principle is
not modular, in the sense that one cannot construct a collection of perfectly good theories
that differ only with how they treat inertial motion. More, the theorems clarify precisely
how it is that the geodesic principle “fits in” among the other central principles of general
relativity.
It seems to me that these reflections suggest a proposal. Instead of thinking of the
foundations of a physical theory as consisting of a collection of essentially independent
postulates from which the rest of the theory is derived, one might instead think of the
foundations of a theory as consisting of a network of mutually interdependent principles—a
collection of interlocking pieces, as in the spherical puzzle in figure 2.14 The idea is that, as
with the geodesic principle, one should generally expect that many of the central principles
of a physical theory may be proved as theorems, given the rest of the theory. Trying to
make a distinction between the top-tier principles and the second-tier principles of a theory
14Feynman (1967) makes a distinction between two ways of understanding physical theories that is similar
to the one I make here. On the “Greek” view of theories, one begins with a collection of fixed fundamental
axioms or postulates. Feynman does not like this way of thinking about theories. Instead, he endorses the
“Babylonian” view, on which one observes that the principles of a theory are more richly connected: perhaps
it is sometimes convenient to take certain principles of a theory as axioms and others as theorems, but one
needs to recognize that in other cases one might want to switch this around and think of your theorems as the
axioms, and use them to prove your former axioms. He then observes that “If all these various theorems are
interconnected by reasoning there is no real way to say ‘These are the most fundamental axioms,’ because if
you were told something different instead you could also run the reasoning the other way. It is like a bridge
with lots of members, and it is overconnected; if pieces have dropped out you can reconnect it another
way” (pg. 46). The view I describe here is firmly in Feynman’s Babylonian tradition. I am grateful to Bill
Wimsatt for pointing out this connection.
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Figure 2: One way of thinking about the foundations of physical theories would have it that some of
the central principles of a theory have a distinguished status as the “truly fundamental” principles. An
alternative view, which I describe and advocate here, is that the foundations of a theory are better thought
of as a network of mutually interdependent principles, interlocking like the pieces of a spherical puzzle. On
this view, one would tend to expect that any of the central principles of a theory should be derivable from
the rest of the theory with that principle removed, much like the overall shape of a puzzle ball constrains
the shape of any individual piece.
is not fruitful, then, since most, or even all, of the principles can be understood equally well
as either postulate or theorem, and indeed, in different contexts it may well be desirable
to think of them in different ways. Importantly, theories are not modular, in the sense
described above. We cannot simply replace any given principle with some other one, at
least not without changing the rest of the theory in possibly dramatic ways. And theorems
like the Geroch-Jang theorem and its Newtonian counterpart are of interest because they
exhibit the details of these interdependencies. They show just how the pieces interlock.
To be sure, nothing I have said thus far should count as an apodictic argument for the
view I have described (call it the “puzzle ball view”). Nor will I give such an argument—
indeed, I am not sure what an argument for the claim that there are no truly fundamental
principles of general relativity would look like. Instead, I merely offer the view as an al-
ternative way to conceptualize the kinds of interrelations between the principles of physical
theories on display with theorems like the Geroch-Jang theorem. Perhaps the proposal is
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best conceived as a conjecture, albeit one with some compelling early evidence, for the fol-
lowing reason: while the senses in which, for instance, the conservation condition and the
geodesic principle follow from other standard assumptions of general relativity are now es-
tablished, the senses in which other principles, such as Einstein’s equation or various energy
conditions, are derivable from or constrained by the rest of the theory are less clear. And so
we have the skeleton of a mathematical question: are all of the central principles of relativ-
ity theory and geometrized Newtonian gravitation (or other theories still) indeed mutually
interderivable in the way that I have suggested? Most or many of them? Or are the geodesic
principle and conservation condition anomalies?
Some important work has already been done on this topic: Dixon (1975) has shown a
sense in which the geometrized Poisson equation is the unique dynamical principle com-
patible with a collection of natural assumptions in Newtonian gravitation; similarly, Sachs
and Wu (1973) and Reyes (2009) have shown that there is a sense in which the (vacuum
form of) Einstein’s equation can be derived from (in effect) the geodesic principle, among
other assumptions, and Curiel (2012) has argued that there is a sense in which the Einstein
tensor is the unique tensor that can appear on the left hand side of Einstein’s equation, even
in the non-vacuum case. Meanwhile, Duval and Ku¨nzle (1978) and Christian (1997) have
argued that even though the conservation condition in geometrized Newtonian gravitation
does not follow from the geometrized Poisson equation, one can nonetheless derive it from
other principles, at least if one considers Lagrangian formulations of the theory. One might
even understand Newton’s argument for universal gravitation as a kind of heuristic argument
that the inverse square law of gravitation is the unique dynamical principle compatible with
certain other central principles of standard Newtonian gravitation (including generalized
empirical facts, such as the universality of elliptical orbits). Results such as these provide
tentative evidence for my basic hypothesis, that one should expect many or all of the central
principles of these spacetime theories to be mutually interdependent.
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But I do not think these results are yet conclusive. Specifically, what has not been done
is to systematically study such results in order to try to characterize, in the way that has
now been done for the geodesic principle theorems, (1) just what the assumptions going
into these theorems are, (2) how natural the assumptions are in the contexts of the relevant
theories, and (3) how these assumptions, in turn, depend on the other central principles
of the theories (if they do). And the attractiveness of the proposal presented here turns
on the answers to these questions. It is only after a project of this form has been carried
out that one can fully evaluate whether the central principles of of these theories are really
as tightly intertwined as the puzzle ball view would have it. That said, if a careful study
of this sort reveals that only some of the central principles of a theory are interconnected,
it may still be fruitful to think about the foundations of theories in the way I propose
here, since the discovery that some central principles of a theory (say, energy conditions in
general relativity) are more peripheral than others need not imply that one can make sense
of a unique or privileged collection of the most fundamental or basic principles. Much will
depend on just what the structure of the situation turns out to be.
It is worth emphasizing that mapping out these kinds of relations between the central
principles of a physical theory is of some independent interest, since understanding the extent
to which the central principles of general relativity in particular are mutually interdependent
could play an important role in the construction of future theories (and in some ways, it
already has) .15 The reason has to do with this idea of “fiddling” with physical theories.
There is a long-standing tradition of attempting to modify general relativity with small
15Feynman makes a related point about the practical importance of his Babylonian approach to theories.
He writes, “If you have a structure that is only partly accurate, and something is going to fail, then if you
write it with just the right axioms maybe only one axiom fails and the rest remain, you need only change
one little thing. But if you write it with another set of axioms they may all collapse, because they all lean
on that one thing that fails. We cannot tell ahead of time, without some intuition, which is the best way to
write it so that we can find out the new situation. We must always keep all the alternative ways of looking
at a thing in our heads; so physicists do Babylonian mathematics, and pay but little attention to the precise
reasoning from fixed axioms” (Feynman, 1967, pg. 54#).
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changes: for instance, in Brans-Dicke theory, one modifies Einstein’s equation to include
an additional scalar field; in TeVeS gravitational theories, one additionally considers vector
fields. In still other cases, one modifies general relativity by allowing derivative operators
with torsion. In each of these examples (and many others), one makes what appears to be
a local change in the central principles of general relativity.
But these small changes can have dramatic consequences: for instance, in Einstein-
Cartan theory, a modification of general relativity with torsion, the conservation condition
does not generally hold. One does not have a geodesic principle, at least in the ordinary
sense, since in general the collection of self-parallel curves picked out by the derivative
operator do not agree with the collection of extremal curves picked out by the metric, and
free massive test point particles need not propagate along either class of curves. Thus,
apparently small tweaks can lead to a dramatically different theory, conceptually speaking.
A clearer picture of just how the central principles of general relativity do fit together and
constrain one another may provide important clarity into just what the ramifications of
these “small” modifications to the theory are, and more, may help guide us in the search
for alternative theories of gravitation, by indicating which principles are more or less tightly
connected to which others. Indeed, for this reason there is a sense in which the situation I
described above, where some principles are very tightly interlocking and others turn out to
be more loosely connected (for instance, some principles play a role as assumptions in some
theorems, but cannot be proved in complete generality themselves) is the most interesting,
from the practical perspective of mapping out the space of possible future theories.
In the next section, I will return to the question of explanation, now from the perspective
of the present view. But before I do so, I want to clarify the puzzle ball view slightly, as the
language I have used to describe it may call to mind two other well-known ideas. It seems
to me that the view I have described is distinct from both. First, note that the present
proposal involves a picture of theories on which one emphasizes the ways in which the
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principles cohere with one another. This way of thinking may be reminiscent of coherentism
in epistemology, a variety of anti-foundationalism that holds that to justify a belief is to
show how it coheres with one’s other beliefs (cf. Kvanvig, 2007). But there is at least
one major difference. Coherentism takes the coherence of one’s beliefs to be a form of
justification for those beliefs. Nothing about the puzzle ball view should be taken to suggest
that the justification for general relativity comes from the apparent fact that one can derive
certain central principles from others—rather, the justification for the theory is based on
its empirical successes. Or perhaps more precisely, our justification for general relativity is
essentially independent of the relationship between the theory’s central principles. To see the
point most clearly, one might well expect both general relativity and geometrized Newtonian
gravitation to be coherent, in the sense of having mutually interdependent central principles.
But this does not imply that they are equally well justified—indeed, general relativity is
better justified than geometrized Newtonian gravitation even if the pieces of geometrized
Newtonian gravitation are more tightly interlocking.16
Another view that the puzzle ball view may be reminiscent of is some variety of Quinean
holism (cf. Quine, 1951). Quine famously used the “web of belief” metaphor when arguing
for the interdependencies of our scientific beliefs, and against the analytic/synthetic distinc-
tion. One might worry that the puzzle ball picture above is just an alternative metaphor
16The suggestion of a connection to coherentism raises a second, related issue. Even if we do not take
the coherence of a body of beliefs as justification for any particular belief, one might nonetheless think of
coherence as a virtue for a body of beliefs: all else being equal, one might tend to prefer to hold coherent
beliefs than not. Should one say the same thing about physical theories? All else being equal, should one
prefer as theory whose pieces interlock? I am not sure that anything in the body of the paper depends on
this, but I am inclined to say “yes”, for several reasons. First, as I argued above, when the central principles
of theories are (partially) mutually interdependent, the theory provides a guide for the building of future
related theories in a way that may be helpful for scientific practice. Second, principles that are mutually
interdependent are protected against claims of being ad hoc. A particular principle cannot be considered
arbitrary or unmotivated if it is derivable, perhaps in multiple ways, from one’s other principles. To put
this point in a more experimentally-oriented way, if the pieces of a theory are mutually interdependent,
then testing any one principle can be understood as an implicit test of the other principles of a theory (See
Harper, 2012). A third reason comes from Bill Wimsatt (1981), who argues that interderivability (or rather,
multiple interderivability) is an indication of theoretic robustness and confers a kind of stability under theory
change.
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used to make a strikingly similar point—indeed, the claim that we cannot make a fruitful
distinction between top-tier and second-tier principles sounds like an argument against an
analytic/synthetic distinction, at least in the narrow domain of the foundations of certain
physical theories. And perhaps it is right that I have recapitulated Quine here, though if it
is, I think the point deserves to be made again since it is relevant for the present discussion
of the geodesic principle. Still, while this chapter is not the occasion for detailed Quine
exegesis, I will point to two ways in what I have proposed is prima facie different from
Quine’s holism, at least on the web-of-belief version.17
The first difference concerns just what the holism is supposed to be doing. Quine uses
the interdependencies between beliefs as an argument for a radical form of conventionalism:
when faced with evidence that conflicts with our beliefs, we have considerable leeway in
choosing which parts of the web of beliefs to revise. Indeed, the web image is supposed to
support a distinction between “central” or “core” beliefs and “peripheral” beliefs such that
we can always accommodate challenges to our full collection of beliefs by modifying only
the peripheral beliefs and leaving the core beliefs intact. But this is precisely the opposite
of what I have argued here, at least with regard to the foundations of spacetime theories.
17My goal in the text is to distinguish the puzzle ball view from web of belief holism. But this should
not be taken to imply that Quine does not come much closer to the puzzle ball view in other parts of his
opus. For instance, Quine (1960, Sec. V) distinguishes “legislative postulates” from “discursive postulates”.
“Legislative postulation,” he writes, “institutes truth by convention...” whereas “...discursive postulation is
mere selection, from some pree¨xisting body of truths, of certain ones for use as a basis from which to derive
others, initially known or unknown” (Quine, 1960, pg. 360). He then goes on to argue that “conventionality
is a passing trait, significant at the moving front of science but useless in classifying the sentences behind
the lines. It is a trait of events and not of sentences.” In other words, one might, when first developing a
new scientific theory, begin with some bare, legislative postulates. But as the theory develops, these truths
“...become integral to the corpus of truths; the artificiality of their origin does not linger as a localized
quality, but suffuses the corpus. If a subsequent expositor singles out those once legislatively postulated
truths again as postulates, this signifies nothing; he is engaged only in discursive postulation. He could as
well choose his postulates from elsewhere in the corpus, and will if he think this serves his expository ends”
(Quine, 1960, pg. 362). The idea, I take it, is that once one has a well-developed scientific theory—such as
general relativity—one often identifies postulates for the purposes of deriving new facts about the theory,
but these are always discursive, and more, which facts or statements of the theory one will take to be the
postulates in any given case will depend on one’s purposes. This picture seems quite close to the puzzle ball
view, indeed. I am grateful to Pen Maddy for pointing out this connection to me.
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Instead, the idea is supposed to be that the foundations of physical theories are not modular,
and that in general one has remarkably little latitude in how one revises a theory in light of
new evidence. And this, I take it, is a desirable feature, since it provides a way out of the
radical conventionalism I just described. Since the various principles of a physical theory
constrain one another, we have very few degrees of freedom for enacting minor changes in
theories in light of new evidence.
The second difference is related (and relates, too, to coherentism as described above).
Quine’s web of belief is supposed to be a (descriptive) metaphor for the sum total of one’s
beliefs. The view I have described here is much narrower in its scope. I do not claim that
all of one’s beliefs interlock in the way described; nor do I claim that scientific knowledge as
a whole can be characterized by a puzzle ball. The view does not even hold that particular
scientific theories have this feature. The suggestion is that the central principles of some
scientific theories are mutually interderivable, that the foundations of some physical theories
should be though of in a certain way. I have been deliberately vague about just what is
supposed to count as a central principle, in large part because I think that trying to list
these principles in advance, even for well understood theories such as general relativity or
geometrized Newtonian gravitation, would be unproductive. In fact, one might expect that
a full account of just what the central principles of a theory are may have to wait until
one sees just what assumptions are necessary nodes when trying to map out the network
of interconnected principles at the heart of a given physical theory. What I have done so
far—and what I think can be done at this stage—is give examples of central principles
of particular theories. And so one can say that among the central principles of general
relativity, for instance, are things such as the conservation condition, Einstein’s equation,
the geodesic principle, and various energy conditions. But the point is that a claim about a
collection of principles of this specific character is quite different from a claim about human
knowledge quite broadly.
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Note that this last point means that there is still a robust sense in which one can think
of some parts of a theory as having a special “fundamental” status, even on the puzzle ball
view. Specifically, one might take all of the central principles of a theory to be fundamental.
This leaves quite a bit of a theory as non-fundamental—for instance, particular predictions
of a theory would not be among the central principles, and so these would not count as
fundamental. If the puzzle ball view is to be viewed as anti-foundational, then, it is only
with regard to determinations of relative fundamentality among the central principles of a
theory.18
6. Explaining inertial motion, redux
Now that I have described the puzzle ball view in some detail, I can return to the question of
principle interest in this paper: namely, is there a sense in which we should understand the
Geroch-Jang theorem and its Newtonian counterpart as explanations? As a first remark, let
me reiterate that if we are thinking in terms of the puzzle ball view, it does not make sense
to think of theories in terms of “top-tier” principles and other, derived principles: in short,
there is no way to make the distinction, at least among the central principles of the theory.
None of the assumptions of a theory are distinguished as the truly basic or fundamental
ones. And if if this is right, then the kind of explanation that we apparently cannot get
of the geodesic principle in general relativity and in geometrized Newtonian gravitation
is uninteresting. No, we cannot derive the geodesic principle in either theory from more
fundamental principles, but that is because it does not make sense of talk of unambiguously
“more fundamental” principles in the first place.
18Feynman, and Wimsatt (1981), argue that in cases where some principles can be proved in many different
ways and others cannot be proved or can be proved from fewer starting cases, one can recover a different
sense of “fundamental” principles, namely that the principles that can be proved in the most different ways
should be understood as the most fundamental. Note that this turns the idea discussed above—where the
most fundamental principles were the top-tier principles from which other principles would be derived, not
the ones most often derived themselves—on its head. This idea is intriguing, but I mention it only to set it
aside as it plays no role in the present discussion.
34
Instead, what we can do is show how the geodesic principle in both of these theories
fits into the rest of the puzzle (as it were). This, too, may be understood as an answer to
the question, “Why do bodies move in the particular way that they do in the absence of an
external force?” These theorems reveal that in the absence of an external force, in the context
of their respective theories, bodies must move along timelike geodesics. In other words, the
other basic assumptions of the theory constrain the motion of (small) bodies. Why timelike
geodesic motion rather than any other? Because in general relativity, we understand matter
to be conserved, and to be such that observers always attribute instantaneous subluminal
velocities to it at any point. And it turns out that these assumptions, in the presence of the
rest of the theory, imply that the only curves along which free massive test point particles
can propagate are timelike geodesics. If we are committed to the rest of general relativity,
then there is only one candidate principle for inertial motion.
So do general relativity and/or geometrized Newtonian gravitation explain inertial mo-
tion? Given the considerations just mentioned, I think the answer in both cases is “yes”, so
long as one understands “explain” in the right way. At very least, these theorems provide
deep insight and understanding into why bodies move in the particular way that they do
in the absence of any external force—which is precisely what we were after when we asked
the question. Moreover, the insight provided is that, in the context of the other central
principles of the theories, the geodesic principle is necessary, the only principle governing
inertial motion that is compatible with our other principles. It is a demonstration of pre-
cisely the ways in which the working parts of general relativity and geometrized Newtonian
gravitation constrain one another.
That said, this kind of explanation differs in some important ways from other explana-
tions that one may be accustomed to thinking about. In particular, if the puzzle ball view is
correct, the kind of explanation I have just described need not be asymmetrical. That is, if
general relativity might be said to explain inertial motion in the present sense by appealing
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to the fact that one can derive the geodesic principle from various other assumptions in
the theory, one should not conclude that the geodesic principle cannot play a role in other
derivations that should also count as explanatory—even derivations of the assumptions going
into the Geroch-Jang theorem or its Newtonian counterpart. Indeed, one should expect that
just as the geodesic principle is constrained by the other central assumptions of general rel-
ativity, so too are the conservation condition, the strengthened dominant energy condition,
and even Einstein’s equation constrained. And by the same reasons I have offered above
for the view that one might justly call the Geroch-Jang theorem an explanation of inertial
motion, one might also say that explanations can be given for the conservation condition or
Einstein’s equation, by showing how these principles of general relativity are derivable from
the other central principles of the theory. In other words, general relativity explains inertial
motion by appeal to Einstein’s equation, but it may equally well explains Einstein’s equation
by appeal to the geodesic principle and other central assumptions of general relativity.
This observation may give some readers pause. There is, by now, a long tradition of
philosophers of science worrying about the so-called “problem of explanatory asymmetry”
(cf. Bromberger, 1966): intuitively, explanations appear to run in one direction and only
one direction. The trajectory of a comet may explain why we see a bright light in the
nighttime sky once every few hundred years, but a bright light in the nighttime sky cannot
explain the trajectory of a comet; the height of a flagpole may explain the length of its
shadow at sunset, but the length of the shadow does not explain the height of the flagpole.
And so, many philosophers have argued, an account of explanation that allows symmetrical
explanations—situations where A explains B and B explains A—is prima facie unacceptable.
A few remarks are in order. First, van Fraassen (1980) has argued, I think correctly,
that explanation should be understood as essentially pragmatic—and in particular, that
explanations should only be understood as responses to certain classes of question. To
determine whether or not some particular response to a why question (say) should count
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as a satisfactory explanation depends on the context in which the question was asked and
the particular demands of the questioner. While in some contexts we might want to say
that a particular explanation runs in only one direction, there may well be other contexts
in which the explanation would run in the other direction. If one is thinking in this way
then the present example is simply a special case: if the question “why do bodies move
in the particular way that they do in the absence of an external force?” is understood as
“does general relativity require us to adopt the geodesic principle as the central principle
governing inertial motion?”, then one is rightly satisfied by a response along the lines of the
Geroch-Jang theorem, even if in other contexts—i.e., in response to other questions—one
might appeal to the geodesic principle to explain (say) Einstein’s equation.
But there is also a more important point to make, here: I do not claim to be offering an
“account of explanation”, or anything like it. I have not suggested that a necessary or even
sufficient condition for being an explanation is to show how the thing to be explained “fits
in” with the rest of a physical theory, in the sense that it is derivable from other central
principles of a theory. The point, rather, is to try to spell out the sense in which a particular
class of theorems that show how the central principles of a spacetime theory fit together
might be understood as explanatory—to say what, precisely, the theorems are doing, and
why one might think of this as a kind of explanation, at least on the puzzle ball view. Not
all explanations work this way, nor do they need to in order for the story I have told here
to be correct. And so, the fact that in some cases, we would want to say that if A explains
B then B cannot explain A in no way undermines the claim that the present explanations
simply do not work that way.
This point can be made most starkly by pointing to various other questions one can ask
about inertial motion, even in general relativity, whose answers would be quite different from
the Geroch-Jang theorem. Consider, for example, a question concerning a particular instance
of inertial motion. Why, one might ask, does the perihelion of Mercury’s orbit precess? One
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would answer this by appealing to some particular initial state of Mercury and features of
spherically symmetric solutions to Einstein’s equation to show that Mercury’s orbit is the
only allowed trajectory for a body with certain properties in a solar system like ours. The
geodesic principle may play a role in this argument, insofar as one might idealize Mercury
as a free massive test point particle, and Einstein’s equation may play a role, insofar as one
would want to consider a spacetime that is a solution to the equation, but the argument
would have nothing to do with the Geroch-Jang theorem. And moreover, one would expect
this sort of explanation to be asymmetric: Einstein’s equation and the geodesic principle,
along with some details concerning the state of the solar system and initial conditions for
Mercury, explain the precession of the perihelion of Mercury; the precession of the perihelion
of Mercury does not explain Einstein’s equation or the geodesic principle.
But this is just the point. If the Geroch-Jang theorem and its Newtonian counterpart
should be countenanced as explanations, it is only because they are satisfactory answers
to particular questions, and they are only explanatory in the context of those demands for
explanation. A question concerning the orbit of Mercury is quite different from a question
concerning the nature of inertial motion generally. And these theorems answer only the
most general version of the question: why this principle as opposed to any other? This is
no mean task, but it is a specific one, and it needs to be treated with care.
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